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R EP O R T  O N  T H E  C AU S E S  OF, A N D  C IRCU M S T A NCES 
ATTENDING, THE FIRE WHICH OCCURRED AT M1CHAEL 
C O L LI E RY, FIFE, O N  9th SEPTEMB ER, 1967 
6th May, 1968. 
The Right Honourable Raymond Gunter, M.P., 
ftfil isler of Power. 
Sir, 
)n accordance with the direction of your predecessor. I held a Public Inquiry 
\\ith respect to the accidem \\hich occurred at Michael Colliery in the County 
of Fife on 9th September, 1 967. The names, ages and occupations of the 
nine persons killed are given in Appendix l .  
2. L opened the Inquiry in the Bcveridge Hall. Kirkcaldy. 011 11th December, 
1967; it lasted five days and the names and occupations of the eighty-three 
persons who gave evidence are gi\cn in Appendi;\ 11. 
3. The interested parties \ \lere represented as follows: 
The Minisrry of Power, by Mr. H. F. Wilson, H.M. Divisional Inspector 
of M ines and Quarries for the Scottish Division, with Mr. H. T. Ramsay. 
Director of the Safety in Mines Research Establisbment, and Mr. G. D.  
Nussey. one of H.M .  Deputy Chief lnspectors of Mines and Quarries. 
The National Coal Board, by Or. H. L. WilleH, Deputy Director-General 
of Production, with Mr. O. J. Skidmore. Director of the Scottish North 
Area, M r. W. Rowell. Deputy Director (Operations), and Mr .  D. D. 
Shaw, Chief Mining Engineer. 
The National Union of Mineworkers, Scottish Area, by M r. M .  i\lcGahey, 
President. with Mr. L. Daly. General Secretary, M r. G. Montgomery, 
Inspector, and Mr. W. McLean, District Secretary, Fife, Clackmannan 
and Stirlingshirc Area. 
The Sco(/jsh Colliery Engil emen, Boilermen and Tradesmen's Association, 
by Mr. W. Lamb, Assi"tant General Secretary. 
The National Associarioll of Colliery O,'ermen, Depuries and S/lOljirers, 
by Mr.  J. Hill, General Secretary of the Scottish Area, with !\.If. W. 
McKibbon, Assistant Secretary, M r. M .  Hynds, Executive Council 
Member for the Fife Area, and Mr. W.  Shaw, President of the Michael 
Colliery Branch. 
The National Association of Colliery Afanagers alld rhe British Association 
of Colliery klanagemenr, by Sir Andrew Bryan, Consulting Mining 
Engineer, with Mr.  G .  Duncan. General Manager, Michael Colliery, 
Mr. E .  Lynn, Secretary of the Scottish Liaison Committee, and Mr. T. 
Barrie, Technical Investigator. 
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4. I find that, in accordance with the medical e\idence, the men died from 
asphyxia by gases produced by a fire which occurred at about 3.30 a.m. in a 
road known as the Loader Mine. Because the affected areas of the colliery 
working were sealed olf in an attempt to contain the fire, a post·jncident 
examination of the area was not possible. The evidence given at the Inquiry 
was, ho\"e\er, �ufficient to lead me to the conclusion that the fire was caused 
by coal, ignited by spontaneous combustion, bursting out into the Loader 
Mine \\ bere it ignited first part of the polyurethane lining of the roadway and 
then the belt of the conveyor sited therein. The resulting fire then in\'ohed 
other inflammable material such as coal and wood in the Loader Mine and the 
Loco Level. The evidence clearly indicated that the fire produced \ ast quantities 
of black smoke which issued, \\ ith little preliminary warning by haze or smell, 
into the intake airways, thereby affecting every district of the colliery. All the 
men in the No. 2 Pit workings escaped, none suffering serious injury, but nine 
men working in tbe No. 3 Pit area \'vere unfortunately overcome by the smoke; 
the bodies of six were recovered. 
G E N ERAL DESCRIPTfON OF T H E  COLLIERY 
Situation and Management 
5. Michael Colliery, which is in the Scottisb North Area of the National Coal 
Board, is situated on the northern shore of the Firth of Forth, in the village of 
East Wemyss, Fife, midway between Kirkcaldy and Leven. 
6. The principal officials at Area level were: 
Director .. . . . . 
Deputy Director (Operations) 





Mr. D. J. Skid more 
Mr. W. Rowell 
Mr. D. D. Shaw 
Mr. J. S. Wilson 
7.  The colliery was managed by Mr. G. Duncan, general manager, witb 
Mr. A. Nicol, deputy manager, and Mr. D. Wilson, Mr. J. Simpson, Mr. A. 
Robertson and Mr. J. Soutar, under· managers. 
Shalls and Geology 
8. The sinking of Nos. I and 2 Shafts, both rectangular in cross section and 
wood lined, was begun in 1892 and reached the Chemiss Seam at a depth of 
1 36 fathoms in 1898. The No. 3 Shaft, 24 feet in diameter and concrete lined, 
was sunk to the present pit bottom at a depth of 300 fathoms in 1928. More 
recently the No. 2 Shaft was enlarged to 20 feet in diameter, concrete lined 
and extended down to 430 fathoms. In 1944, No. I Pit was completely filled in 
and the two remaining shafts were used for winding coal. No. 3 serving as the 
downcast and No. 2 as the upcast. Safety lamps were in use throughout the 
rnlne. 
9. The working seams 3re all contained in (be productive coal measures of 
tbe carboniferous series; the total thickness of strata between tbe top seam, the 
Pilkembare, and the bottom seam, tbe Lo\\er Dysart. is 225 fathoms, within 
which there are 19 seams. They dip seawards in a south·easterly direction at 
gradients varying from one·in-three to one·in·two. The coalfield is remarkably 
2 
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fau!t·free, but there is one major quartz dole rite transgressive sill running 
roughly north·easl where the measures are thrown up about 50 fathoms to the 
north·west. At the time of the fire five seams were being worked, the Dysart 
Main and the Four Feet in No. 3 Pit and the Chemiss, Bowhouse and Branxton 
in No. 2 Pit. 
Manpower and Output 
10. The cOlliery employed 2,190 men, 1,874 underground and 316 on the 
surface. The average weekly output of 16t750 tons was produced from fully 
mechanised shearer loader faces, as fol lows: 
Chemiss Seam (No. 1 0  District) 
Four Feet Seam (No. 31 District) 
Bowhouse Seam (No. 40 District) 
Branxton Seam (No. 22 District) 
Dysart Main Seam (No. I District) 
Dysart Main Seam (No. 3 District) 









11. The checking system in force at the colliery had remained unchanged for 
many years. A man reporting for work changed his clothes in the baths and 
then went to the lamp room to collect his lamp. He then went to the check 
office window. called out his personal number and collected two checks. one 
square and the other round, bearing this number. On going underground, he 
dropped the square check into a container at the pit botlom and retained the 
round one. When the last man underground had gone to his work, the 
container was brought up the pit and the square checks were put 011 the check 
board as an indication that the men concerned were underground. At the 
end of the shift, each man on coming to the surface dropped his round check 
into the check office window. The round check was then placed on the board 
with the corresponding square one indicating that the man was now above 
ground. A lamp number was allocated to a man when he first joined the 
colliery. There was no relationship between the lamp and the check numbers, 
but, each being related specifically to individuals, were complementary to each 
other and served as a double check. 
12. As will be seen later in the Report, some confusion arose over the numbers 
of men still beJow ground at various stages in the incident. I t  is desirable 
that the National Coal Board and H.M.  Inspectors should examine the 
possibility of improving checking systems. 
Method of Ventilation and Working 
1 3. Ventilation was provided by a Howden J ,000 horse·power radial How 
fan situated at No. 2 Shaft and producing 310,000 cubic feet of air per minute 
al 3· 5 inches water gauge. T here was a standby fan, a two stage Aeroto 400 
horse·power 100 inch diameter unit with a capacity of 225,000 cubic'"feet of air 
per minute at 2· 5 inches water gauge, There were no underground booster 
fans. 
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14. Access to the Sections in the No. 2 Pit workings was by horizon mines 
and, in the No. 3 Pit workings, by roads in the seams. Plans Nos. I and 2, 
which cannot be scaled, are isometric drawings, which have been prepared 
to clarify. visually, the relationship of workings on different horizons. In order 
to appreciate the extent of the workings, it  may be noted that a man going 
along the 430 fathoms mine from No. 2 Pit Bottom would travel 1 ,530 yards 
to the Coal More Turn, 2,530 yards to the Compressor House and 3,537 yards 
10 the return road head of the Bowhouse No. 40 Section. A man starting from 
No.3 Pit Bottom would reach the top of the Four Feet Dook in 870 yards and 
the intake road head of the No. 3 1  Section in 1 ,560 yards. On the Dysart Dip 
side of the colliery, the distance from No. 3 Pit Bottom through the intakes 
to the Dysart Dip No. 3 Section road head was 1.967 yards. The scale of 
Plan No. 2 can be visualized by noting that the distance along the Loco Level 
from the Dysart Turn to Bell's Heading was 320 yards. 
No. 2 Pit �'orkings 
15. From the 300 fathoms level at No. 3 Shaft bottom. the 360 fathom le\Ol 
was reached by three dooks (dipping roads) in the Dysart Main Seam and t\, 0 
in the Lower Dysart Seam. The 360 Lateral Level Mine followed the line of 
strike in a south.westerly direction with two level cross cuts (Nos. I and 2) 
driven through the seams along the line of full dip to give access to the large 
field of coal to the seaward side of the quartz dolerite sill. From the No. 2 
Shaft bottom level at 430 fathoms, a level mine ran in a westerly direction with 
two cross cuts (Nos. I and 2) driven along the line of full dip to make contact 
with the coal seams. The cross cuts at the 360 fathom and 430 fathom le,els 
were connected by road ways driven on the full dip of the various seams, and 
from these road ways the working sections advancing along the line of strike 
were developed. Air circulated from the No. 3 Shaft, dov ..n the Dysart Dooks, 
through the 360 fathom Lateral and the No. 1 and No. 2 Cross Cuts, into the 
working sections, returning through the 430 fathom cross cuts into the 430 
fathom Lateral to the J',o. 2 Shaft. 
No. 3 Pit workings 
1 6. From the 300 fathom level at No. 3 Pit Bottom, road ways had been 
driven in the coal to the full dip and from them the various sections of the 
Dysart Main coal \,orkings advanced along the line of strike. Also from 
No. 3 Pit Bottom a level mine, called the Sea M ine, had been driven in a south· 
easterly direction, cross cutting all the seams in the field. At the lime of the 
fire, the Four Feet Seam was being worked from the Sea M ine, workings in the 
Barncraig, Chemiss, Bowhouse, Branxton and Boreland having been abandoned 
at various times between 1956 and 1 960. The most recently abandoned 
section of tbe Sea M ine workings was in the Branxton Seam, but a pumping 
station was still maintained there. Air for the Four Feet workings entered 
along the Sea Mine and returned to the upcast shaft at the Bowhouse Inset 
by way of the Old Branxton and Bowhouse workings. The only open route 
to other collieries was a connection, driven in 1963, in the Lower Dysart Seam 
to Lochhead COlliery. 
The Loader Mine and the Loco Level 
1 7. The Loader Mine was supported throughout by 1 5  feet long straight 
steel girders set at three feet intervals, on seven feet sleel props attached to the 
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girders by specially designed clamps. The sides or the roadway were lined 
with a mixture of treated fireboards and concrete slabs, in the estimated 
proportion of 20 per cent of the former to 80 per cent of the latter, set in the 
webs of the girders and props. Any small falls had been filled with untreated 
timber and t here was also untreated timber over the tops of the roof girders. 
18 .  The Loco Level "as supported by 14 reet by 10 reet arched girders. The 
sides of the road were lined mainly with fireboards but there was some untreated 
timber above the arches and, as necessary, behind the fireboards. 
19. The junction of (he Loader Mine with the Loco Level was supported by 
straight steel girders resting on brick pillars at (he centre and a brick wall 
around the junction. Runners were provided across the girders with fireboards 
between the webs. Untreated timber had been used to fill the space, estimated 
at 9 to 1 2  inches in thickness, above the girders. 
20. Coal from the Oysan Dip workings was brought up to the Loader Mine 
on a cable belt conveyor. I t  was then carried down the Loader Mine to the 
Loco Level by a belt conveyor 36 inches wide, 200 feet long with a 1 5  feet jib 
extension, and driven by a 36 horse-power motor at a speed of 390 feet per 
minute. The belting was made of fire resistant anti-static P.V.c. manufactured 
t o  National Coal Board Specification 158/1960. 
2 1 .  The electricity supply cables in the Loco Level were PVCDWA, P. V.c. 
sheathed at 550 volts and PILCDWA, P.V.c. sheathed at 3,300 volts. 
The Telephone System 
22. There were three internal telephone systems at the colliery. The first. 
an automatic system, was installed in 1957 and had facilities for up to 100 lines. 
It served, in addition to other places, the intake and return gates of every 
\\orking district, and the loading points, junctions and bunker stations. Two 
extensions, serving the general manager and deputy manager, had priority call 
facilities which enabled either official to interrupt a conversation on any of the 
other lines. The second system, of the magneto·call type, had a manual 
exchange in the time office. The third was a system of local telephones, some 
of which had loudspeakers, for point to point communication underground. 
Fire-Fighting Arrangements 
23. The plan of the fire-fighting arrangements in the No. 3 Pit Botlol11 area 
at the time of the incident showed that eight hydrants were sited as follows : 
four in the 300 fathoms lateral, of which one was at the shaft bottom, 
one at the junction with the Sea Mine, one at the junction with the Lower 
Dysart Man Haulage Dook and one midway between the two latter points� 
and 
four in the Loco Level. of which one was at the Dysart Turn. one near the 
junction with the Old Pumphouse, one at tbe junction near the stopped 
off No. 3 Heading and one at the junction with Bell's Heading. 
Plans had been made for a ninth hydrant to be sited in the Loader Mine, but 
the pipeline from the shaft was not complete. Fifteen hoses with other fire­
fighting gear were kept in a station near the Old Pumphouse and 14  hoses 
with other fire-fighting gear in stations at each end of the New Pumphouse. 
It was said in evidence that the fire-fighting plan was revised once a month. 
that there were 86 trained men at the colliery and that drills were held about 
three times a year. 
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RECE N T  H I STOR Y 
24. The most significant events at the colliery in recent months having a 
bearing on the fire in September were a heating in the Loader Mine on 24th July, 
and a fire in the Dysart Dip No. I Section on 6th August, 1967. 
The Heating of 24th July 
Discovery 
25. During the morning of241h July. J. T. Brown, deputy engaged on special 
duties, looking up the Loader Mine from its junction with the Loco Level, saw 
smoke coming from a point on the right-hand side which later proved to be 
about 40 yards from the junction. He then investigated morc closely and, 
finding smoke \\as issuing from the top of the girders, telephoned D. \Vilson, 
the undcr�manager in charge of reconstruction, at the pit bottom. \Vilson 
had actually passed through the Loader Mine three quarters of an hour earlier 
but had noticed nothing untoward. 
Dealing with the July beating 
26. D. Wilson who received the telephone call between 9.30 a.m. and 
1 0.00 a.m. at once recognising the serious potential of the heating ordered the 
immediate withdrawal of all men likely to be affected by it and informed the 
manager. The conveyor belt in the roadway was withdrawn from the affected 
area and hoses run out from a hydrant in the Loco Level near the Old 
Pumphouse. This presented no difficulty because the hydrant was at the time 
on the intake side of the Loader M ine, the direction of ventilation being along 
the Loco Level from Tilson's Alley. That the air was moving in this direction 
was largely a matter of chance because this cbanged from time to time according 
to lhe temperature on the surface. After the reconstruction of the No. 3 Pit 
Bottom during the summer holidays of 1967, this variability ceased and there 
was a greater flow of air into the Four Feet Section with the result that the air 
in the Loco Level settled down to flow constantly from the Loader Mine 
towards Tilson's Alley. 
27. The point where the fire had occurred was in an old fall  area; when the 
fireboards between the RSJ webs were removed, three feet of packing timber 
and the coal above it were found to be burning. The burning material was dug 
out for quenching and the work continued during the remainder of the day 
and on into the succeeding night. Ultimately a cavity about eight feel high 
and ten feet long was excavated. The area was cooled down from about 
1 50 degrees fahrenheit to about 70 degrees fahrenheit and Wilson was convinced 
that the fire was " definitely out " before packing of the cavity was commenced. 
29. A.  H .  Barker, H .M.  District I nspector of Mines and Quarries, visited 
the area soon after the incident was discovered and agreed with the immediate 
measures being taken to deal with the situation. He then travelled the return 
airways and detected carbon monoxide at the stopping on the hjgh side of the 
No. 3 Heading, but found none in the return itself. D. Wilson also made an 
inspection of the return airway in the vicinity of the place where it  crossed 
the Loader Mine. He neither saw nor smelt anything unusual, but he did 
notice that the concrete raft at the crossing had beaved up. He thereupon 




29. Later that day Barker attendeu a meeting of the management at \\hich 
the general lines of removing the burning material and of sealing the cavity 
were agreed. The discussion also took in the need to eliminate any air leakage 
between intake and return airways in the triangular area bounded by the 
Loader M ine, No. 3 Heading and the Oysan Main Return. An essential feature 
of this reinforcement was to be the treatment of a length of the Loader Mine 
with polyuretbane foam. Another was to breach the stopping in the return at 
tbe entrance to No. 3 Heading and to fill any voids found. 
30. The cavity in the Loader Mine \Vas filled with sandbags built up on the 
RSJ's with plaster puddled between the bags and the coal sides. Both the 
inbye and out bye sides of the cavity were treated in this way, leaving a narrow 
shaft up the middle and this was similarly treated using fireboards as supports 
for the sandbags. Temperature tests were taken throughout the filling operation 
and at no time did it  exceed 70 degrees fahrenheit. D. Wilson was satisfied 
that « a sound and efficient job" had been made of the filling. 
Treatment of the Loader Mine 
Application of polyurethane foam 
3 1 .  As soon as the immediate danger was passed, the management turned 
its attention to longer term measures. it was decided that the lining of the 
Loader Mine with polyurethane foam should extend over a length of some 
1 50 feet between the Loco Le\el and the Cable Belt Road. Verbal arrangements 
were made immediately with the Caledonian M ining Company to carry out 
the work. On 28th July, colliery workers, under the general supervision of 
company representatives, started to prepare the site and on 30th July machinery 
and material required for applying the foam were taken underground. 
J. Simpson, an under-manager, exercised control over the work when he 
returned from holiday on 3 1 st July. Preparation of the site included the m:1king 
of four recesses each about four feet wide and two feet deep cut into the sides 
of the roadway to provide adequate sealing for the foam lining. Simpson 
found no signs of heating but decided to play safe and have the four recesses 
treated with polyurethane foam immediately. With the resumption of 
production at the colliery following the annual holiday, however, the actual 
work of spraying the foam had to be restricted to the night shift from 3 1 st July, 
because the application of polyurethane foam constituted a hazard to health 
while spraying was in progress. 
32. C. V. Peake, deputy managing director of the Caledonian M ining 
Company, explained that the work of foam application in the Loader M ine 
was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the National Coal Board 
Production Department Information Bulletin No. 65/253. The polyurethane 
used had been ordered from the manufacturers by reference to the Board's 
specification ; this included a provision requiring a flame inhibitor to be incor­
porated in the polyurethane mix. The foam was applied in two coats. giving 
a total thickness of about one inch. In the first instance no mention was 
apparently made by any of those concerned about the need for the applied 
foam to be treated with a coating of a fire-retardant material as indicated in 
para. 5(ij)(c) of the Bulletin. On 3rd August, however, the management 
arranged with the Caledonian Mining Company for the coating to be applied 
7 
as soon as the foam work \\as complete. The materiJI necessary for this wa� 
delivered to the coll iery, but, for reasons which I shall explain later, it was 
neHr used. 
Subsequent inspections 
33. The work of appl:ring Ihe foam was completed on the night shift of 
5th-6th August. Shortly after this, Barker inspected the polyurethane foam 
lining and found it satisfactory ; there were in fact one or two very small holes 
around some cable hangers but these he took to be of no consequence. A few 
days earlier he had travelled the return aif\\ ay in Ihe vicinity of the Loader 
Mine with J. S. Wilson. production manager. They inspected the stopping 
at the junction of the return airway and No. 3 Heading and found no carbon 
monoxide. At that time the stopping had not been breached with a view to 
filling any voids but some pipes and pumps had ne\ertheless been installed 10 
facilitate the performance of this work as soon as it could be started. AI 
about 1 .30 p.m. on 8th September, M .  R. Bottomley, H .M.  fnspector of M ines 
and Quarries, in the course of an inspection for another purpose. travelled 
through the Loader �line, had a quick look at the foam, passed his hand over 
parts of the surface and considered it to be satisfactory. He did not sec, smell, 
or feel anything indicative of spontaneous combustion. There was no fire­
retardant coating on the surface but it was his understanding that this was to 
be applied when other foam \\ork in the Oysart Dip No. I Section, to which 
I shall refer later, had been completed. 
Contract arrangements 
34. The decision ha\ ing been taken that the work of lining the Loader Mine 
with foam should be carried out quickly, the parties concerned-the manage­
ment and the Caledonian Mining Company-agreed to dispense with the 
normal rormalities of obtaining a quotation and dra\dng up formal contract 
documents. I nstead, they agreed that the work should be carried out under 
a verbal contract based on the N.CS. Information Bulletin mentioned above. 
Later there was an exchange of letters to this effect. A. Cairns, mining engineer. 
special duties, measured the work for payment on 1 7th August. 
35. The parties to this verbal contracl considered that the Information 
Bulletin did not specifically require the surface, to \\ hich (he polyurethane 
foam was to be applied, should be treated "jth a lining of fire-retardant material. 
For this reason, it was explained that the work ordered to be done in the first 
instance was restricted simply (0 the application or foam. By omitting any 
reference to an application of fire-retardant material beneath the foam, the 
management had already settled by implication that this was not necessary, 
because the Loader Mine was already lined \\·ith concrete slabs and fire­
resistant boards. I t  was arranged on the 3rd August that the work to be 
undertaken by the Caledonian Mining Company of applying a coating of 
fire-retardant material on the polyurethane when foam spraying of the lalter 
was complete, should be the subject of another verbal contract. 
The Fire in the Dysart Dip No. 1 Section 
36. On 6th August, the day after the completion of the foam treatment of 
(be Loader Mine. a fire occurred in the Dysart Dip No. I Section. The 
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management considered this to be a greater risk to the safety of the mine than 
the Loader M ine, which was now treated with polyurethane foam, and decided 
to have the Dysart Dip No. I Section main gate treated in the same way. 
They deferred the work of lining the foam in the Loader Mine in accordance 
with the arrangements which had been made three days before, concentrated 
their efforts on applying polyurethane foam in the Dysart Dip No. I Section 
and completed this early on the night shift of 8th-9th September. 
The Night Shift of 8th-9th September 
37. Following the fire in the Oysan Dip No. 1 Section, an increased number 
of air samples were taken daily under special arrangements designed to ghe 
information about the effectiveness of the fire·fighting measures taken there. 
On 8th September, a carbon monoxide analysing and recording device installed 
in the Section was tested satisfactorily and, as a result, the special arrangements 
for sampling were discontinued in favour of the normal sampling pattern. 
To avoid the misleading effects of carbon monoxide produced by shot firing, 
the usual practice was for samples to be taken daily at the end of the night 
shift. O .  C. Dryburgh, a deputy engaged on special duties, was instructed to 
this effect when be went on night shift on the evening of 8th September, and he 
planned to collect his samples at about 5.00 a.m. 
38. At about midnight, Oryburgh travelled along the Loco Le\ el and went 
through the No. 6 Heading into the main return. Walking along the return, 
he passed the stopping to No. 3 Heading, and came out through the No. 2 
Heading. He bad some experience of spontaneous heating, but, in the course 
of his inspection in the vicinity of the Loader Mine, he neither smelt nor saw 
anything which gave him cause for concern. 
T H E  EVENTS O F  9 t b  S E PT E M B E R  
The Start of the Fire 
39. In the early part of the night shift of 8th-9th September, at about 
midnight, J. lzalt, cable belt attendant, was cleaning up lhe Cable Belt Road 
near its junction with the Loader Mine. He heard several rumbling noises; 
he did not regard them as unusual, however, thinking they were due to normal 
movement of the strata. At about 2.30 a.m. he travelled down the Loader 
Mine and went into the under·manager's office on the low side of the Loco 
Level, where he saw A .  Stirling. overman. He told Stirling that he had heard 
rumbling in the roof and that there had been one loud bang. As a result of 
this conversation, Stirling went up the Loader Mine a few minutes later to 
where Izatt was working. He noticed nothing unusual en route and concluded 
that the bang had resulted from the breaking of the sandstone roof. 
40. About an hour later SlirUng, having returned to the under·manager's 
office. smelt smoke coming through ventilation pipes from the Loco Level. 
He went out of the office to the Loco Level where he saw a blue haze. He then 
turned right into the Loco Level and walked as far as No. 3 Heading whicb he 
entered and found quite clear. He came back and looked up the Loader Mine 
and saw what he took to be burning coal falling from the roof about 20 to 
25 yards away from him. There was no smoke. Amongst a small quantity 
of this material, he particularly noticed " one piece lying on the floor about 
six inches square and it was blazing ; i t  was black but there were fumes coming 
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from it ". He rushed along the Loco LeHI, up Bell's Heading and back down 
the top end of the Loader Mine where, about 15 or 20 yards from the entrance. 
he met fzatt coming out of \ery heavy smoke. Izatt had returned to his \\ork 
in the Cable Belt Dook, and had been cleaning out at the back of the loading 
point when he had been suddenly enveloped in thick black smoke. The 
conveyors were stationary and had been so for some time, ahhough the) had 
been running normally earlier in the shifl. 
4 t. Stirling sent Izatt up Bell's Headmg (Plan No. 2) and told him to inform 
the on setter at No. 3 Shaft bottom about the fire. The onsetter, J. J. Tee\an, 
sent for R. Mclnt) re, the pit bottom deputy, \\ho sa\\ lzatt in a state of collapse 
under the pit bottom clock at 3.50 a.m. Stirling himself went to the telephone 
at the bottom of Bell's Heading and tried to telephone the Dysarl Dip Sections. 
Getting no answer, he \�ent to the Coronation Dipping (Plan No. 1) and senl 
P. Ritchic, a backbrusher. to warn the men in the Dysan Dip No. I Section. 
After again trying unsuccessfully 10 telephone No. 2 and No. 3 Sections. he 
spoke to T. Lisler, deputy, in charge of the surface Control Room, and told 
him" There is a fire at the Cable Belt Load. get everybody concerned informed .
, 
42. Izatt's arrival at the o. 3 Shaft boltom and Stirling's message to Llsler 
raised the alarm. Following this, a very large number of telephone calls were 
made and messages sent by men to warn others. At (he time, there "'ere 
311 men below ground: 45 in No. 3 Pit Bottom, 64 in the D)s3n Dip Sections. 
25 in thc Four FeCI Section and 177 in the No. 2 Pit workings: it is remarkable. 
ha\ ing regard to the denseness of the smoke and its irritant effect, that all but 
nine escaped. There is no doubt that, in large measure, this was due to the 
comprehensive and rapid manner in which messages \\ere transmitted round 
the pit. 
43. The following account of the warnings gi \en to the men underground 
and their escape from the pit is based on the e\ idence of many of the \\ itnesses. 
It must be borne in mind that \er) fe\\ of them looked at their watches to ched. 
the time and that the smoke was so thick that they \\-ere often unable to see 
their companions. 
The Surface 
["ents between 3.30 a.m. and 5.15 a.m. 
44. Lister's duty in the Control Room was to receive and pass on messJges 
and information. He did not keep a complete log. Before he gave Stirling's 
message to C. Webster, the senior overman in charge of the night shift. he 
received a routine call from J. Tait, the oyerman in the Four Feet Section. 
Lister informed him that a fire in the Cable Belt Dook had been reported and 
that he thought that the trouble was confined to the Dysart Dip side of the pit 
Next, W. Semple, Jnr., an overman in the Branxton No. 22 Section, who had 
received a message about the fire from A. Watson, an overman in No. 3 Pit 
Bottom. rang the Control Room for further information. Eventually, at about 
3.45 a.m., Lister spoke to Webster and was instructed to withdraw all the men 
from the Dysart Dip Sections and to call A. Nicol, the deputy manager, and 
J. Simpson, the under-manager for the Dysart Dips. Soon afterwards, \Valson 
telephoned to say that, as conditions were worsening, the Rescue Brigades 
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should be called out. There was some inconclusive discussion bet\\een Lister 
and the Time Office staff about \\ho was authorised to do this. The upshot 
of it was that Lisler persisted in his attempts to summon Nicol and J .  Simpson 
and managed to speak to the former at 4.00 a.m. or shortly afterwards. 
45. icol's first reaction on receiving the call from the colliery \\as that" It 
was one of t hose roadway heatings ". He left for the colliery straight away and 
on arrival found that Lister could not give him any definite information about 
the ituation underground. He was told that some men had already been 
taken to hospital and, seeing three or four men \\ ho had come up the pit. 
learned from them of the condition that they had seen, including the fire In 
the Loader Mine. He deduced" I had a belt fire on my hands ". At about 
4.35 a.m. he \\eOl to his office to determine a plan of action. He instructed 
the telephone operator to gel the Rescue Station for him but the c::1I1 \\as 
frustrated by a number of incollling callers including Ihe police and the hospital. 
He arranged for the general manager, G. Duncan, and the under-managers, 
J .  Simpson and D. Wilson, to be sent for. He spoke to Stirling in Bell':, 
Heading \\ ho told him that he was putting up screens to fight the fire and 
expressed concern about the chances of all his men to escape. The call to the 
Rescue Station was logged at 5.00 a.m. After a con"ersatlon \\ ith Mclntyre, 
who like Stirling was concerned about the difficulties of m en escaping through the 
smoke, Nicol decided 10 stop the fan. The evidence about the times 1:-. 
conflicting but it appears likely that it was stopped at about a quarter to (he 
and restarted about half an hour later, after Stirling had sent a message that 
the smoke was backing up Bell's Heading and was hampering the fire-fighting. 
Events after 5.15 a.m. 
46. Duncan reached the colliery at about 5. 1 5  <1.m. and too\.. charge of 
operations. He was told that there were possibly 60 men in the Dysart Dip 
Sections, 30 in the Four Feet Section and a considerable number in the 0. 2 Pit 
workings. He realised that the only way of imprO\ ing the prospect of their 
safe withdrawal was by reversing the ventilation in the Loco Level .  When 
reports were received that the Dysart Dip and the No. 2 Pit Sections we re clear 
of men, attention was concentrated on the Four Feet and a dccision was la\..cn 
at about 6.00 a.m. to open the doors in No. 2 Heading to draw the sl110ke imo 
the Dysart Main Return (Plan No. 2). Although the doors were opened at 
7. 1 5  a.l11. by a rescue brigade, the smoke cOlltinued to Oow into the Sea Mine 
for a further two hours. 
47. At about 7.00 a.lll. W. Rowell. the deputy director (operations), reached 
the colliery and collaborated with Duncan in exercising overall control. During 
the afternoon, it was agreed at a meeting of repre�ntali\es of all the partlc::, 
concerned that it was unlikely that the three mcn who had not been found 
could be rescued but efforts to this end continued for a further 24 hours until 
3.00 p.m. on 10th September. 
No. 3 Pit Bottom 
48. After McJntyre had seen lzalt iD a collapsed state at No. 3 Shaft bottom, 
he went down Bell's Heading to withdraw his men from the New PumphOll',>e 
(Plan No. 2). He was Slopped by smoke at the Loco Level but on going rOllnd 
the other way he met B. While, the pumpsman, in Tilson's Alley. Meanwhile, 
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J .  Duncan. the plImphousc greaser, had informed A. Watson in the Overman's 
Office that smoke was going from the Loco Level into the Sea Mine. After 
seeing this for himself. Watson made a number of telephone calls to warn 
inbye sections and Mclntyre telephoned to the pumpsman in lhe Chemiss 
Inset and told him to go up to the surface. 
49. A. S. Todd, the overman in charge of reconstruction. after seeing the 
lire in the Loader Mine. hurried back to No. 3 Shaft and instructed J .  Field, 
the reconstruction deputy, to withdraw all the men in the Pit Bottom Section. 
After making several telephone calls Todd with K. Buckley. another overman, 
opened the doors in Davidson's Mine in an attempt to direcl the smoke from 
Dysart Turn to the upcast shaft. Thereafter lhey continued lO assist the men 
coming out of the Sea Mine. 
50. At about 5.00 a.l11. the under-managers, D. Wilson and J .  Simpson 
arrived. the onc at the Sea Mine and the other at the Dysan Dip side. All the 
45 men in the No. 3 Pit Bottom Section reached the surface safely. 
Dysart Dip Sections 
Dysart Dip Sect.ions generally 
5 1 .  After Stirling had sent Ritchie into the Dysart Dip No. I Section and 
had spoken to Lister. he was able to speak to R. C. M. Fraser, a deputy at the 
return road head in Dysart Dip No. 3 Section, and to J .  H. Drummond, a 
deputy at the foot of the cable belt (Plao No. I) .  He told them that all tbe men 
\\ere to come out through the return airway. the No. 3 Dook. Amongst 
others, he aJso spoke to J. Drummond, the shot firer from the Dysart Dip 
No. 2 Development, and to J. M. Imrie, one of the development workmen, 
agreeing with them that, in view of the denseness of the smoke, it would be 
better for them to walk up the return rather than to attempt to go up the intake 
on the manriding train. 
52. Stirling accompanied by D. C. Dryburgh, deputy, went down the 
Dysart Dip No. 2 Dook and opened tbe doors in tbe Dysart Dip I A 
connection. Finding tbat this had little effect on the smoke, they closed them 
again and, with some difficulty. returned to the East Loco Level. Stirling was 
driven back up Bell's Heading by the smoke when the fan was stopped but he 
remained in the area throughout his shift organising the escape of the men and 
the fire-fighting. 
53. T. Barr, the Dysart Dip manriding haulage driver. lowered the train on 
receipt of a signal at 3.40 a.l11. The journey took five minutes in each direction. 
He stopped the train at Dip No. 1 on the way uP. and later heard some men get 
off at the top; he lowered it again and brought up one man, J. McDonald, the 
pumpsman. He then lowered the train for the third time and, while it was at 
the bottom, the electric power went off. A. McRobie. the foreman electrician, 
who was with Barr, had defeated the top over-run switches so that the train 
could be drawn up as far as possible; when the power went off, he came up 
Bell's Heading through the smoke which was coming out of the Loader Mine 
and met Stirling wbo asked him to get the fan re-started. Being unable to 
find a free telephone, he went up the pit and reported to W. L. Wilson, the 
colliery electrical engineer. who was going into the automatic telepbone 
12 
I 
exchange to attend 10 a breakdown. Arter obtaining permission from Nicol, 
they re-started the f::ln. 
54. Of the 64 men in Ihe Oysan Dip worklllgs, al l  but two escaped. 
P. Thomson, a greaser on the Cable Belt Dook, was last seen at about 3.00 a.m. 
near the motor hou:)e at the lOp of the No. J Dook by J.  DUllcan, who worked 
in the New P1l1l1phousc. His body was recovered from the Cable Belt Dook by 
a rescue brigade (Plan No. 3). J. McKay, a greaser, was with a number of 
men near the telephone when J.  Drllmmond was speaking to Stirling. The 
smoke at that time was very thick and McKay \\as not seen again. 
Dysart Dip No. J Section 
55. Ritchie went in through the Oysan Dip No. I Section top road and found 
J .  Culross, the overman, and J .  Unden, the face deputy, at the road head. 
He then returned with some of the men and came out through the East Loco 
Level (Plans Nos. I and 2). Culross telephoned down the face and sent Linden 
out along the bottom gate, where he met men coming up from other sections. 
He returned with the last of these men to Bell's Heading. W. Armour, the 
road ways deputy, was told by a workman at 3.45 a.m. by his watch, that 
smoke was coming into the section. He sent his men out through the face and 
went along the bottom road to the dooks. The smoke was light grey at first 
but it turned black later; it smelt of burnt wood and caught his throat. 
Dysart Dip No. 2 Development 
56. J.  Drummond, a shot firer, who was firing shots in the bottom of the 
two roads being driven to develop tbe Dysan Dip No. 2 face (Plan No. I )  
smelt smoke coming in through the ventilation tubes and went out to the 
telephone near the pumphouse where he spoke to Stirling and warned McDonald. 
Thick black smoke was coming down the dooks when he was joined by men 
from the development headings and J .  McKay, the greaser. They \"ent back 
to the No. 3 Dook, the return airway, through the doors al the top road of the 
Dysan No. 3 Section and made their way outbye through the smoke in several 
separate parties. McDonald, bowever. went down to the bottom of the No. 1 
Dook, stopped the pumps, and made his way up the No. 2 Dook. He went 
to the No. 3 top road doors where he saw J.  Watson and R. Bernard, deputies, 
but returned to the manriding train. After he had been hauled to the top. he 
signalled the bogies down again to fetch Watson and Bernard. 
Dysart Dip No. 3 Section 
57. J.  Watson, R .  Bernard and R .  C. M. Fraser. deputies, were in the top 
road head of Dysart Dip No. J Section when they received a message from 
Stirling that all the men were to go out through the No. 3 Dook. Fraser 
went down the face where he met E. Moore, the overman, and travelled out 
along the bottom road with him. They met J .  H .  Drummond and checked 
with him that all the men further inbye had been warned. J. H. Drun1lllond 
went on to the face keeping pace with tbe smoke and taking the workmen with 
him. Eventually all these officials and workmen travelled in smoke up the 
No. 3 Dook to the stairs at the top, where visibility \\3S only about ten feet 
and several of them who were physically distressed had to be helped. 
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58. By this time, the smoke had backed along the East Loco Level and 
consequently the men had to travel out through the Dysart Main Return. 
Because there were alternative routes from the top of the Coronation Dipping 
and the No. 3 Dook, J .  Linden went back into the return at about 4.30 a.m. to 
show any men coming up the best way out. They travelled in small parties; 
some, finding thick smoke at the doors in the No. 2 Heading, came out through 
roads with which they were unfamiliar to the 300 fathoms Latera l ;  others came 
through the I in 1 Drift and Davidson's Mine; one group, who tried to come 
out to the Lochhead Level but were stopped by smoke, went back to the return 
airway and others after attempting other routes eventually came out through 
the overcast to the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook. 
Four Feet Section 
Warnings and withdrawal of men 
59. A great many telephone messages were sent to the Four Feet workings. 
In  most cases they were simply to the effect that the men should come out, but 
J. E. Nowak, a belt maintenance man, standing near the Dysart Turn saw the 
black smoke going into the Sea Mine. and accordingly advised J. Tail, the Four 
Feet Section overman, and J. McArthur, a greaser, to come out through the 
return. Eventually all the men, except McArthur and J .  C. McEneamy, a 
beltman, who were accompanied part or the \\ay by A. Taylor, the deputy, 
No. 3 1  face, walked out hy lhe shortest \\ay. the one they were accustomed to 
travel, through the Sea Mine, which \\as filled \\iIh black smoke before any 
of them entered it. 
60. D. Hunter, the road ways deputy, recei"cd an urgent message and came 
oUlbye sending his men on ahead. He met haze 1 50 yards from the face and 
smoke as he rode on the conveyors up the Four Feet Dook. At the top he 
telephoned to \"arn H .  Gallacher. the 750 Branxton pumpsman (Plans Nos. 1 
and 3) and then stayed a few minutes to keep the conveyors running. He 
ne>.t tried to get to the top of the 750 Branxton Cable Belt Dook where some 
of his men had been working but he managed to travel only about 40 yards 
in the dense smoke. (The men had already seen the smoke and escaped 
successfully). Hunter then went out bye along the Sea Mine to the Dysart 
Turn where he saw se"eral men including Todd, Buckley and Mclntyre. He 
told them to start the conveyor and to shout into the Sea Mine to see if they 
could get any answering calls. After a while he heard a voice and, with nil 
visibility, he went into the smoke and guided by shouts found C. Cunningham, 
pumpsman, lying on the ground. He carried Cunningham most of the 
50/60 yards into fresh air receiving help from some men at the Dysart Turn 
( Plan No. 2). 
6 1 .  Meanwhile, Tail had sent messages up No. 3 1  face to warn the men and 
had telephoned to Taylor who was at the face return roadhead. All the men 
except Taylor came down the face and walked out through the Sea Mine. 
D. Wilson, an apprentice fitter, set off from the face with J. Smith and 
A. Thomson. power loader operators. They rode up the first of the two 
conveyors in the Dook together but when they reached the top of the second 
one, Thomson was not with them. About 50 yards from the Dysarl Turn, 
D. Wilson found A. Grieve, a maintenance man, lying on the floor and told 
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him to get up and keep \\'all..ing. Ho\\ever, when \Vilson found that Grie\te 
was not follo\\ ing him, he lifted him on to his feet and assisted him to fresh <tiro 
62. Several of the men who came out of the Sea Mine vomited and most of 
them suffered from dizziness. coughing and loss of power in their legs. Of the 
25 in the workings at the time, 18 were able to e�cape. 
Escape of men from the Sowhouse Inset 
63. Immediatel) after McArthur at the top of the Four Feet Dook had 
received the telephone message advising escape through the return, the blacl.. 
smoke appeared. He telephoned to McEneamy, who was at the bottom of 
the Dook, and arranged to meet him at the top. They went through the 
doors into the No. 31 Section top road and saw Taylor coming towards them. 
After Taylor had been through the doors and seen how thick the smoke \\as 
in the intake, they set off up the return airway which was signposted. They 
turned left at the first junction and stopped for a rest at the ladder at the next 
junction (Plan No. I ) . They saw the first signs of smoke in the return at this 
time. Taylor, who had been alone at the top of the No. 3 1  face. did not know 
that his men had gone down to the bottom road ; in spite of protestations from 
McArthur and McEneamy, he decided to go back to make sure that they \vere 
all out, being particularly worried about Gallacher, the 750 Branxton pumpsman. 
He arranged with McArthur and McEneamy that ir he did not return in a few 
minutes. they should look for him and, ir they did not find him quickly, they 
\\ere to go through the return, rollowing the signs. After about five minutcs, 
they went back down the return, but not seeing Taylor they set off outb)e. 
At  the top of the ladder, they turned right ; continuing to turn right and 
follO\\ ing the signs to the " Escape Pit ", they came to the junction of Walker's 
Dook and Steven's Brae. They went up Steven's Brae to the inset in o. 2 
Shaft at the Bowhouse level. By this time, the smoke was quite thick but. on 
going towards No. 3 Shaft, it cleared and they stopped 3t a fence where there 
was a .. no road " sign. They spent some time in old workings to the north 
or the shafts and eventually returned to thc No. 2 Shaft l nset. McEneamy 
started to strike an old rusty bell-plate with a brick and they shouted when 
they saw a cage go by. Later, a second cage with rescue men blowing hooters 
passed them. 
64. When A. D. H.  Smith, overman, came up the No. 2 Shaft at about 
7.00 a.m., he heard and saw nothing, but W. Shaw. acting as a rescue brigade 
captain, heard voices at 10.35 a.m. Shaw's brigade who returned down the 
shaft were unable to identify the inset but L. M.  Irvine, the workmen's inspector, 
deduced that it must be at the Bowhouse level. A rescue brigade under 
G .  Prall, part-time rescue man, went down at t 1.30 a.m. to attempt a rescue 
but, on account of signalling difficulties, they were unsuccessful. McArthur 
and McEneamy were eventually brought out through the No. J Shaft at 
about 2.50 p.m. 
No. 2 Pit Workings 
Warning messages 
65. C. Webster, the senior overman, was in the Bowhouse No. 40 Section 
bottom road wben he was told at about 3.45 3.m. that there was a fire in the 
Cable Belt Dook (Plan No. I ). He told T. Inglis. an overman, that he was 
going out bye to see about it but made no mention of withdrawing the men from 
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the No. 2 Pit workings. He rode on a locomotive out along the 360 fathoms 
Lateral, finding blue haze at the Compressor House and smoke at the turn 
half way between Nos. I and 2 Cross Cuts. He came back il1bye, made 
arrangements about withdrawing the men and then walked down through the 
360 fathoms No. 2 Cross Cut to the Compressor House in the 430 fathoms 
Lateral where he spoke to Nicol at the surface. He got the impression that 
Nicol had just arrived at the colliery and was as much in tbe dark about the 
fire as he \\ as. 
lnbye sections 
66. Meanwhile Nowak had spoken to W.  K. Paterson, a deputy in charge of 
mecbanisation, al the Coal More Turn and advised him to send the men out 
through the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook. A.  Watson at No. 3 Pit Bottom 
had told some workmen in the 360 fathoms Lateral to warn everyone to go 10 
the No. 2 Shaft via the 430 fathoms Mine. These messages were passed on 
and, in the event. all the men in the No. 2 Pit workings were safely withdrawn. 
67. The men from Ihe inbye workings made their way to the Compressor 
House via the 430 fathoms Lateral, where they were checked out by their 
deputies. Some of them were taken out on locomotive trains to the bOllom of 
the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook. The majority of the men walked up the 
Dook: some required assistance on account of the steep gradient. 
No. 2 Pit Bottom 
68. A.  D .  H .  Smith left the Coal More Turn at about 4.40 a.m. and walked 
along the 430 Mine towards the shaft. He was passed by two fitters \\ho told 
bim that there was Cl fire Clnd that the men should withdraw. Near the pit 
bottom at about 5 . 10  a.m. M .  Blankenstein, a deputy. told him that the onsctter 
had gone up the shaft and that it was closed. After some delay in gelling 
through on the telephone. Smith spoke to Nicol and told him that be had a 
stretcher case to send up and that the atmosphere was getting hazy. All the 
men except about half a dozen were sent up by 5.40 a.m. Readings taken 
with a P.S. carbon monoxide tube showed a trace at the pit bottom and a little 
more in the 430 Mine. Smith went to the bottom of the Lower Dysart 
Manriding Dook to satisfy himself that all the men from inbye were out and 
finally rode up the No. 2 Shaft at 7.00 a.m. leaving the acting on setter and the 
pumpsman at the pit bottom to await their day shift reliefs; their senices 
were required as the pumps had to be run continuously. He kept in 
touch with them frol11 the surface by telephone. 
69. W. Cull, a deputy, \\ent down the No.3 Shaft at 8.50 a.m. with the day 
shift onsetter and pumpsman. They walked down the Lower Dysart 
Manriding Dook and found thick smoke on the inbye side of the doors to the 
430 Mine. After leaving the doors open for a while, it cleared and they went 
on to the No. 2 Shaft bottom. Conditions deteriorated and at 10.45 a.m. 
wearing short period breathing apparatus. they were brought up the No. 2 
Shaft by a rescue brigade. 
70. l cannot conclude this necessarily brief account of the escape of the men 
from the mine without referring to their general behaviour. That the evacuation , 
was completed in extremely difficult conditions in such a commendably short 
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time IS III itself a tribute to the very high standard of self-discipline exercised 
by all. Under-officials displayed their concern for the safety of the men in 
their cbarge and the men an equal concern for the welfare of their workmates. 
That there was at times some confusion is, in the circumstances which obtained, 
quite understandable. That there was at no time the slightest degree of panic 
is remarkable. Had there been, the death role in this incident would 
undoubtedly have been very much higher. 
Rescue Brigade Operations 
7 1 .  As I have said earlier the Cowdcnbeath Rescue Station was called at 
5.00 a.m . ;  the first van left in a matter of minutes and arrived at the coll iery, 
some 1 5  miles away, at 5.35 a.m. The first brigade went underground at 
5.55 a.m. quickly followed by a second brigade from Cowdenbeath and by a 
brigade from the colliery. Coatbridge Rescue Station was alerted at 5. 10 a.m. 
and were called out at 5.50 a.m. They had a brigade underground by 7.20 a.m. 
72. As an initial task, the rescue brigades soughl to penetrate the Sea Mine, 
but attempts had to be suspended at 6.45 a.m. because the smoke had become 
so dense. In order to reduce this, it  was decided to send a rescue brigade, 
under W. Shaw, the colliery fire officer, to open the three doors in the No. 2 
Heading (Plan No. 2). They attempted to do this from the intake side but 
were driven back by heat and smoke. They then travelled 450 yards in a smoke 
laden atmosphere to reach the doors frol11 the return side. The first two doors 
were successfully opened but, on opening the third, they were subjected to a 
blast of intense heat, which singed them and stung their eyes. Visibility was 
considerably reduced. Some of the brigade were blown over by the blast and 
their ultimate return to base was only achieved with great difficulty. At about 
the same time, the body of P. Thomson, greaser, was located in the Cable 
Belt Dook and a rescue brigade under W. A. Kennedy, rescue man, recovered 
i t  at about 8.30 a.m. (Plan No. 3). 
73. At about 9 . 1 5  a.m., the atmosphere ill the Sea Mine improved and a 
brigade under J .  S. Moyes, rescue man, went in there again. On coming out 
at 9.35 a.m., they reported having seen four bodies along the Sea Mine inbye 
ihe Redd Road. Further brigades were then sent in and the bodies of J .  Smith, 
A.  Henderson, A.  Thomson and H .  Morrison, power loader operators, and 
J .  Tait, overman, were recovered between 9.40 a.m. and 10.25 a.m. Thereafter 
a brigade, captained by W. Aitken, rescue man, commenced a reconnaissance 
of the Four Feet area in a search for McArthur, McEneamy, Taylor and 
Gallacher, all of whom were still missing, but found no signs ofthern. Conditions 
were fair at first but they worsened, so much so that a second brigade, under 
J .  McG. Ma1colm, was sent in to recall the first brigade. The brigades failed 
to make contact with each other but the first returned to base at about 1 1 .00 a.m. 
and the second at about 1 .00 p.m. by which time conditions had deteriorated 
considerably. 
Development of the Fire 
Conditions in tbe Loader Mine 
74. As we have seen, in investigating the fire he had observed, Stirling 
hurried round from one end of tbe Loader Mine, where the atmosphere was 
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clear, to the other end, where he found [zatt coming out of thick smoke. The 
distance was less than 200 yards and the journey time probably no more than 
two minutes. Yct in this short time, an apparently clear atmosphere had 
changed to one ladened with dense smoke, A few minutes later, Barr, the 
Dysart manriding haulage driver, was standing with Stirling at the j unction 
with the Bell's Heading and saw flames, which he thougbt were at the junction 
\\ ith the Cable Belt Dook: the flames appeared to be coming down from the 
roof and striking the floor. Some ten minutes later, McRobie went down the 
upper length of the Loader Mine and saw dense smOke and two or three pile') 
of burning material in the mjne inbye of the cable belt junction, while Mclntyre, 
from a short distance into the Loader Mine. particularly noticed an intense 
fire which appeared to be somewhere near the junction of the Loader Mine and 
the Cable Belt Dook. At about the same time, Todd and Buckley sa\\ smoke 
coming from between the boards in the webs of the girders; they reckoned they 
were about 20 yards from the cable belt transfer point. 
75. Soon after the fall had been restarted, J .  Simpson was able to go do\'vn 
Bell's Heading as far as the East Loco Level. Looking down the Loader Mine, 
as he passed the junction, he saw extremely dense smoke. On his way bad., 
at about 5.35 a.m., he and Webster penetrated the Loader Mine as far as the 
return end of the conveyor. About six yards ahead of them they could scc 
flame creeping up from the floor on the left-hand side of the roadway. Some 
time later, fire-fighters were able to get below the return end of the cOIl\ICyor 
and they saw glowing material i n  a pile some 30 yards from lhe cable belt 
transfer point; the heat overhead was intense. When the smoke abated, 
G, C. Cowie, developer. was able, from the transfer point. to see two fires. 
one quite small, about three or  four feet across on the belt some ten yards 
down and the other. much larger, some twenty yards farther on, burning 
fiercely across the full width of the mine and three or four feet above tbe level 
of the belt. 
Examination of the Loader Mine 
76. By 7.00 a.m., the fire had been reduced to a small one on the belt about 
seven yards below tbe junction of the Loader Mine and the Cable Belt Dook 
and a much larger one at a point about 25 yards below the junction, A few 
minutes before 7.00 a.m. J.  Simpson was again in the Loader Mine \\hen he 
observed that, whilst the cable belt was whole at the return drum, the top belt 
was gradually charring towards the louvre plate until it disappeared into 
powder; the bottom belt was fused to the rollers. At the start of the stretch 
of road treated with polyurethane foam, the roof and right-hand side \\ere 
covered with black charred blisters, There were some places from wbich the 
foam had been completely burned exposing the fire-resistant boards and 
concrete slabs. At  about the same time Shaw scratched the burnt foam surface 
with a nail and one inch or so of " black stuff" came a\vay to reveal a chalky 
brown colour beneath. 
77, Much later, at about 6.00 p.m. A.  H. Barker, H ,M.  District Inspector, 
went five yards beyond the cable belt transfer point. He saw burning material 
on the floor twenty yards beyond him and observed that the conveyor belt had 
melted and was hanging in sbreds around the return drum. Where he was 
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standing, he found the foam surface had been charred black to a depth of a 
sixteenth of an inch but the foam beneath was sound. 
Spread of smoke in the Loader Mine 
78. The smoke spread from the fire rapidly up and down the Loader Mine 
into both the Cable Belt Dook and the Loco Level. I t  split both ways along 
the Loco Level, to the Dysart Nos. I and 2 Dooks in one direction and to the 
Sea Mine and the Lochhead Level in  the other. The consensus of opinion 
among the \\ itnesses who gave evidence was that the smoke was first smelt, 
then seen as a white, grey or blue haze and then as very dense and black. The 
nearer the witnesses were to the Loader Mine the quicler was the change 
from haze to dense black smoke. There was evidence that the smoke had 
reached the Dysart Dip No. I Section and the Four Feet No. 31 Section by 
about 3.45 a.m., and the 360 Lateral by 4.00 a.m. 
Opening doors and stopping the ran 
79. The first priority in  dealing \\ith the emergency was to give the men an 
opportunity of getting out of the pit. The next was to make it possible for 
the rescue brigades to search for those not accounted for and, if not found 
alive. to bring out the bodies. The intakes had been contaminated by smoke 
right from the start. Reversing the ventilating currents mjght be thought 
to have been a course affording some relief. In fact it would have taken i.J 
considerable time to take effect and. in  any event, would not have been a 
sensible action because the returns would have been more quickly affected by 
smoke than in  fact they were. Stirling and Dryburgh attempted a local short­
circuit of air by opening the doors i n  the Dysarl Dip l A  Connection \\ith a 
view to minimising the spread of smoke into the inbye Oysan Dip Sections. but 
this was ineffective. With more success, Todd and Buckley opened the doors 
in Davidson's Mine to afford relief to the Sea Mine. Nicol's action in SlOpping 
the surface fan seems 10 have had no effect at the Sea Mine side and it 
aggravated conditions on the Dysart Dip side. He therefore decided to restart 
the fan but it was not until 9 . 1 5  a.m. that the smoke began to clear at the Sea 
Mine entrance. The most likely reason for this development was that the 
surface fan doors had by then been slightly opened and the fan slowed down, 
rather than stopped. The relief was of short duration. however, for conditions 
were as bad as ever by 1 .00 p.m. 
Spread of fire from the Loader Mine 
80. The fire had spread into the Loco Level well before 7.00 a.lll. and flame 
was seen i n  the roof at the Old Pumphouse entrance at about 7.30 a.m . ;  a 
little further towards the Loader Mine burning coal was falling from the roof. 
The fire spread slowly towards the Sea Mine and by 4.00 p.m. had reached 
Tilson's Alley. At  1 0.00 a.m. flame was seen i n  the main return at the 1-in-1 
Mine and much later at 6.00 p.m. fire was burning fiercely at the junction of 
Bell's Heading and the Loco Level. 
Fire-FightiDg 
Attempts to control the fire 
8 1 .  As soon as men could be assembled after the discovery of the fire, 
arrangements were made for a screen to be erected in the Loader Mine near 
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the Bell's Heading junction. Hoses were brought to the Loader Mine but, as 
the nearest hydrant was in smoke in the Loco Level, they could not be used. 
There was insufficient hose a\ ailable to use the hydrant at the bottom of No. 3 
Shaft, the nearest in fresh air, so the hydrant was itself transferred to Bell's 
Heading. The filling of this hydrant took some time and it was not until two 
hours after the outbreak of fire that water was first applied to it. When the 
newly·sited hydrant was brought into use. it was successful in isolating the 
burning material on the floor of the Loader M ille but the fire was by then 
virtually out of control. The heat was intense and prevented any advance by 
fire·fighters towards the Loco Level ; indeed, they soon had to be withdrawn 
to the transfer point. Smoke frustrated an attack on the fire through Bell's 
Heading and the Loco Lc\el. At  about 7.30 a.m. D. Wilson, under·manager, 
saw fire in  the Loco Level from the Old Pumphouse entrance. There was some 
delay in obtaining hoses: sometime after 8.30 a.01., however, fire·fighters 
started to play water on (he fire, although a roof fall restricted their activity. 
After about half an hour, they had to withdraw leaving their hoses to play on 
the fire. Fire·fighting in this part of the pit bottom continued until about 
1 .00 p.m. when the supply of electricity and water both failed. 
82. Apart from the use of water, screens were erected, doors opened, the fan 
stopped and started and later slowed down. all as measures designed to control 
the fire and the movement of smoke. 
Effect of measures 
83. The effect of opening the doors in Davidson's Mine was to increase the 
quantity of air, and thus smoke, passing along the Loco Level towards the 
Sea Mine and so to reduce the quantity going towards Bell's Heading. 
Notwithstanding this, after an initial clear period, smoke in considerable 
quantity passed along the Loco Level and down Nos. I and 2 Dysan Dooks. 
Smoke moving towards Tilson's Alley was diluted at the Alley and again at 
the Dysart Turn, where it split three ways. Nevertheless considerable quantities 
of black smoke still passed into the Sea Mine. one of the three splits. The 
opening of the No. 2 Heading doors, probably because the doors at Davidson's 
Mine wcre open at the same time, seems to have had no marked effect on the 
fire or smoke movement, but. as I have mentioned earlicr, the slowing down 
of the surface fan and the partial opening of the fan doors was probably 
responsible for a temporary clearance of smoke from tbe Sea Mine. 
Extent to which measures failed 
84. At about 6.00 a.m. it became apparent that eleven men were mlsslllg. 
By 1 1 .00 a.m. six bodies had been recovered. Two men were rescued from the 
Bowhouse Inset at 2.30 p.m. J. McKay, last seen in Dysart Dip No. 3 Section, 
A .  Taylor, who went back in along Four Feet return and H. Gallacher, the 
750 Branxton pumper, were still missing. Efforts were made to fight the 
fire in such a way that it might be possible to find the three men but by 3.00 p.m. 
on 10th September, conditions had so deteriorated that it was decided that 
too many men were being placed at risk and stoppings would have to be put 
on, thus sealing in the bodies. On the evidence brought before me, 1 am 
satisfied that this was the right decision. 
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S C I ENTIFIC E X P E R I M E N T S  
85. At the Inquiry D. G. Wilde, a Principal Scientific Oificcr in  the Safety in 
M ines Research Establishment of the: Ministry of Power, described a series of' 
experiments which had been carried out at the Establishment's Buxlon Station 
to obtain information about the behaviour of polyurethane foam \",hen 
subjected to igniting agents of different i[lIcnsity. 
The Locus of the Experiments 
86. The experiments were carried out in  an arched roadway, 240 yards long, 
seven feet high and seven feet wide, ventilated by a fan which was so adjusted 
that the airspeed in the roadway was 200 feel per minute. In the first three 
experiments, the roof and sides of the roadway \\ere lined \Vith a two inch 
layer of polyurethane foam for a distance or 23 yard!) ;  the area !)o covered was 
1 34 square yards. The thickness of two inches was chosen because at that 
time the inrormation was that this had been the thid..ness of the foam lining 
in the Loader Mine although subsequent evidence indicated that the lining wa'\ 
only one inch thick. In the fourth experiment the foam was applied to Ihe 
inside surfaces of a steel duel 75 reet long, rour reet high and four reeL \\ ideo 
The fifth experiment was a variation or the first three in that the roam in the 
roadway was coated with a fire· retardant material. 
The Experiments 
The first experiment 
87. The purpose or this experiment was to te!)t the innammability and 
combustibility of the foam lining when it was ignited at the upwind end and 
to compare the result with that observed in an earlier series of experiment!) in 
which timber lining was used. The igniting agent v.as a stack of timber and a 
roadway lining of untreated timber which together weighed about 860 pounds. 
This timber was sited in the roadway just upwind of the foam ;  the igniting 
agent occupied a five yard length of the roadway and had it peak output of 
four megawatts. and an average of two megawatts over one hour. 
88. Within two minutes of ignition ftame developed over the whole area of 
the roadway and large volumes of dense black smoke, having temperatures III 
excess of 1 ,000 degrees centigrade, were produced. The initial rate of flame­
spread across the foam was observed as being between 1 20 and 1 50 feet per 
minute; burning of the foam lasted for 90 seconds at any given point. Thi� 
rate of propagation compared with a rate of one foot per minute observed in 
other experiments in which the roadway was lined only with untreated timber. 
Although instrumentation was made difficult by heavy deposits of solids. it 
was found that the oxygen content of the atmosphere reil  to se'"en per cent, the 
carbon dioxide concentration rose to 13 per cent, and the carbon mono;..idc 
concentration exceeded one per cent. The rate of evolution and colour of the 
fumes emitted were of a kind never experienced in timber fires. Examination 
of the roadway showed that virtually all the foam had been bllrned a\\ay and 
that the fire had increased in intensity as it moved away frolll the igniter. 
The second experiment 
89. This experiment was designed to test the inllammability and combusti­
bility of the foam lining when ignited at the centre of the lined area, to ObHtill 
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information on the risk of the burning foam igniting fire-retardant treated 
timber down\\ind, and to observe to what extent flame would propagate against 
the 'ventilation. The igniter on this occasion was capable of developing 
2·4 megawatts and of lasting six minutes. The timber downwind was composed 
of J 50 treated boards weighing about 850 pounds forming a roadway lining. 
90. Within 90 seconds of ignition, flame spread with the ventilation at 
78 feet per minute and against it at 90 feet per minute. Smoke travelled \\ilh 
the ventilation at about 230 feet per minute and backed up against i t  at 160 feet 
per minute. The general character of the smoke was similar to that observed 
in the first experiment. Examination of the roadway after the fire sho\\ed that 
all the foam do\!' nwind of the midpoint had been consumed, but upwind patches 
of partly burned foam remained. The treated timber down", ind had been 
charred to a depth of about ten per cent of its thickness. Other work at the 
Establishment suggested that untreated timber, subjected to the heat developed 
by the polyurethane f03111. would have burned fiercely producing very hot 
fumes containing almost no oxygen and high concentrations of carbon dioxide 
and carbon monoxide. 
The third experiment 
9 1 .  The purpose of this experiment was to determine the order of the power 
required to ignite a foam lining. The capacity of the igniting agent was 
stepped up in stages from a small paraffin wick developing 40 watts to an oil 
burning igniter of 2,000 walts (in all of which cases there was no sign of general 
ignition) and, finally, 10 an igniter which burned tbree-quarter ounce of mineral 
hydraulic oil per minute providing an output of 20 kilowatts. I n  all cases, 
the igniters were so placed that the flames from them made contact with the 
roam lining. The 20 kilowatt igniter was placed at floor level eight yards from 
the downwind end of the foam lining. Immediately after the igniter was fired. 
flames spread up the roadway wall to a height of about five feet and 70 seconds 
after ignition a cloud of vapour was suddenly generated on the crown of the 
roadway. This cloud ignited and a violent fire ensued. Within nine minutes 
the fire was over and the smoke had cleared away. While alight, the fire seemed 
to fluctuate and this suggests that in some conditions the foam will burn in 
such a way as to consume most of the available oxygen ; the flame is therefore 
temporarily quenched until fresh supplies of oxygen are available when the 
conflagration is resumed. 
n,e fourth experiment 
92. This experiment with foam applied to the inner surface of a steel duel. 
was set up to determine whether a fire could be propagated in the foam lining 
by a mass of glowing and flaming solid fuel falling into the duct. The igniter 
in tbis case cOllsisted of a 2 :  1 coke/coal mixture contained in a steel box sited 
centrally over the top of the duct. The mixture and the siting of the igniter 
and the lining of the duct with foam was intended to simulate :the situation 
which might occur when hot burning coal from a gob fire is discharged into a 
foam lined roadway. The fire was given its own air supply and when it was 
judged to be sufficiently developed the burning coke/coal mixture was discharged 
into lhe duct by way of an opening in the top. 
93. Examination of the duct after the fire had gone oul showed that all the 
foam had been consumed and, althougb the experiment was on a smaller scale 
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tbaD the others and the airspeed higher, tbe fire in the duct had features very 
much in common with those iD the earlier experiments. 
The fifth e><perirnent 
94. This experiment was designed to test the effect of applying an igniter 10 
foam which had been coated. The igniter was of the type used in the first 
experiment and was sited at the centre of the lined area. Downwind of the 
foam, five yards of the roadway was lined with limber treated with a fire. 
retardant. \Vhen the fire was ignited, it burned more fiercely than had been 
expected, developing a power of seven megawatts and the roadway lining was 
subjected to a fire of great intensity, greater indeed than had been used against 
the uncoated foam in earlier experiments. There was no indication of flame 
other than from the igniter and the experiment was stopped after an hour. 
The oxygen concentration never fell  below 1 4  per cent and was usually above 
1 8  per cent. 
95. Visual inspection of the roadway afterwards disclosed that Done of the 
lining had been burned or affected with the exception of a small area which had 
been scorched. The fire·retardant coating had separated from the foam in 
places, the separation in some instances being in the form of bulges. Cracks 
had appeared in some of the bulges and the mechanical strength of the coating 
appeared to have been reduced by the fire. The lining timber downwind 
was not even charred, although the surface had become rather brittle and some 
resinous substance had exuded. 
An Appreciation of the Experiments 
96. Wilde advanced the view that the experiments demonstrated the hazards 
of uncoated foam in conditions which were designed to resemble, but not 
exactly reproduce, those which obtained in  the Loader Mine. He saw no 
reason to suppose that a fire in the Loader Mine would not have had the same 
general characteristics as the fire experimentally produced at Buxton. He 
would have expected all the polyurethane iinjng the Loader Mine, with the 
exception of patches, to have been burnt in tbe same way as was found to be 
the case in the fourth experiment. He accepted that the lining in  the Loader 
Mine was thinner than that used in the experiments but he thought that the 
difference in  the behaviour of the fire would have been significant only in 
regard to its duration. 
97. I t  was his opinjon that foam uncoated with a fire·retardant material was 
highly inflammable material with a low fire resistance; provided flames from 
the source of ignition made contact with foam, the heat output of the source 
itself need Dot be large to start a fire. I f  a fire behind a lining of foam heated 
the foam to a temperature of between 150 and 200 degrees centigrade, the fire 
would break through. Before the break-through, however, the foam lining 
masked the heat behind and prevented the issue of the gaseous products of 
combustion, and the smell therefrom. Once the foam was burning neither the 
speed of the air in the vicinity nor the thickness of the lining would have much 
influence on the rate of spread of flame. 
98. There seemed little doubt, given the intensity of the fires generated 
experimentaJJy, that a P.V.C. belt within the range of the fire would have been 
consumed by it .  Both foam and P.V.c. belting produce thick black smoke, 
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the particulate content of which is fundamentally carbon, and fumes " hich 
contain carbon dioxide and carbon monoxidc. In addition, the polyurethane 
would produce other and more complex gases, and the P.V.c. would produce 
gases containing chlorine. Wilde was, however, unable to explain " hy black 
smoke persisted for so long in the fire at the colliery; he could not say \\ het her 
temperatures of the order of 1 ,000 degrees centigrade would havc penetrated 
cracks between fireboards and concrete lining slabs and ignited coal and \\ood 
behind them. 
99. Pressed to gi\e some indication on likely concentrations of gases from 
the fire which would have been produced at \arious times and places, such as 
the Sea Mine, Wilde explained that, although he had considered the matter, 
he had been unable to reach a reliable conclusion. 
T H E  C A U S E  OF T H E  F I RE 
100. \Vhile detailed examination of the area was not possible after the fire, 
there was no e\ idence produced at the Inquiry which would suggest that it was 
initiated by any means other than the spontaneous heating of coal in the roof 
of the Loader Mine. I t  must. of course. be conjectural ho\\ sufficient air got 
behind the lining to initiate and sustain a healing. W.  Rowell, the deputy 
director (operations), suggested that there must have been intake to intake 
leakage but this vie\\ is only valid if one accepts that the seals into the sides 
of I he Loader M ine or those along the sides at floor level were defecti\ e. There 
was no evidence to this effecl. I t  is difficult to be more precise than to say that 
the heating occurred in the roof coal somewhere in that reach of the Loader 
Mine which had been lined w ith polyurethane foam. But it is, I think, probable 
that the source of air leakage which caused this \\as in the direct connection 
with the No. 3 Heading between the Loco Level and Dysart Main Return 
bet\\een which there was a difference in waler gauge of It  inches. I n  
considering just how the fire developed two facts are, I think, of outstanding 
importancc. First, there was in a very short period of lime the production of 
large volumes of thick smoke and, second, that such carbon monoxide as 
was produced was diluted to less than lethal concentration. I n  this latter 
connection it is important to note that, although all the six men whose bodies 
were recO\cred showed some signs of carbon monoxide poisoning, there was 
no marked degree of this in any of the large number of people who escaped. 
1 0 1 .  It  is known that concrete slabs can become cracked or broken when 
subject to hjgh temperatures and that heated coal loses its inherent strength as 
combustion progresses. I t  is probable that the falling of burning material 
observed by Stirling was continued as a larger fall developed when the burning 
coal. bereft of its inherent strength, became a dead weight on the concrete 
slabs and the foam lining. And it may be that the burning of this larger fall 
accounts for the sudden issue of smoke which apparently occurred in the 
minute or two which it look Stirling to hurry round to the other end of the 
Loader Mine. However. the experiment I witnessed at Buxton showed that 
the burning seen by Stirling would have sufficed to ignite the foam and so 
bring about a polyurethane fire, which would have produced the same sudden 
issue of heavy smoke. What happened after this is again a matter for 
conjecture but the absence of high concentrations of carbon monoxide in the 
diluted products suggests that the rate of ventilation through the Loader Mine 
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was reduced by the fire. The c\ idence of the Buxton experiments leads one 
to think that the fire fluctuated in intensity both up and downwind in the 
Loader Mine. Here again. the burning of the P.V.c. belting would, I thinJ..  
be involved in much the same \\ay. That is to say it  did not burn uniformly. 
but in patche::, as it became subject to higher temperature::, produced by burning 
foam. This, and a reduced rate of ventilation, would account for the continued 
production of large \ ol umes of smoke and fumes containing relatively small 
q uantities of carbon monoxide. but dangerous quantities of other toxic gases. 
Once sufficient heat had been generated by the initial fire there \\ere of course 
other materials, such as coal and untreated timber, a\ ailable to 11. 
102. Both Sir Andrew Bryan and Mr. Hill drew attention to the \inual 
absence of warning of the initial heating. Laboratory experiments, howeHr. 
ha\e sho\\n that the foam is such a good sealant in that it not only keeps out 
air but elTectively masks any temperature changes, no"{ious gas emissions and 
the smell associated with heatings. Thus all the signs by which colliery 
personnel might have detected a heating were absent. This would explain 
why Dryburgh, some time after midnight, noticed nothing untoward. M oreover 
\\hen Izatt reported to Stirling that he heard rumbling noises-these could \\("11 
h�ve been strata movements or even tbe cracking or concrete lining blocks 
Stirling made a n  inspection of the Loader Mine; this too� place less than an 
hour before the fire broke out but he noticed nothing unusuaL 
103. That a fire-retardant c03ting had nOl been applied lO the foam in the 
Loader Mine \vas not disputed. The management explained that application 
of the coating had to be deferred while another fire in the Dy::,art Dip No. I 
Section was dealt with. This may well be so but I feel sure that had they 
recognised just how inHammable polyurethane roam is -and I take their 
evidence as meaning that until thcy saw the Buxlon experiments they did not 
they would have proceeded \\ith the placing of the coating Ilot\\ ithslanding the 
demand for men to deal with the other fire. Thjs is not 10 say that a retardant 
coating would necessarily have prevented the fire. Indeed. 1 recognise the 
possibility that burning coal breaking through the roam lining could \\ell have 
left a hole with a ragged edge and tbe then exposed. foam would have been 
susceptible to ignition either by coal burning on the floor or by fire i n  the ca\ity. 
104. I consider that polyurethane foam as at present constituted is an 
unacceptable risk and that its use in, and near the entrances to, all  mines should 
be discontinued. I understand that almost a mile of road ways have been 
treated with polyurethane foam but, notwithstanding the difficulties involved, 
I am sure thal the fire hazard \\arrants its complete removal or scaling off as 
soon as practicable. 
R E L A T E D  M ATTER S  
The Calling of the Rescue Brigade 
105. Within minutes of discovering the fire, Stirling was warning the surface. 
Lister reacted with responsibility to the situation-as witness the messages 
and inrormation he passed underground-and clearly the question of calling 
out the Rescue Brigade exercised his mind as part of the larger issue of declaring 
an emergency. He obviously regarded himself as unqualified to call out tht: 
Brigade and decided to leave it to Nico!. N icol's first reaction when he reached 
the colliery about 4. 1 5  a.m. was that the Rescue Brigade should be summoned 
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and he asked for them to be called on the telephone. As a result of telephone 
delays and other distractions, the Brigade was not called until 5.00 a.m., some 
90 minutes after the fire had been discovered. This i.s not the first report in 
recent times on a mining accident where reference has had to be made to delay 
in calling the Rescue Brigade. J t  is true that, as events turned out, the delay 
on this occasion in no way conrributed to the loss of l ife. Even if the Brigade 
had been called at the earliest possible moment, at, say 3.45 a.m. they could 
not have established their underground bases much before 5.00 a.m. by which 
time the smoke was so dense that their operations would have been impossible. 
Nevertheles , the situation might well have been different. Here was a clear 
case of emergency underground; yet the Brigade remained unsummoned for 
90 minutes. 
Tbe Emergency Organisation 
106. Clearly there was uncertainty among those officials immediately 
concerned with the events of the early morning about the exercise of authority 
to declare a formal state of emergency at the coUiery. Lister, upon whom 
fell the brunt of having to deal with the emergency when it was first reported 
to him, certainly did Dot regard himself as authorised to initiate the full 
emergency procedure. Webster, who was at a remote point underground and 
who was not really in  a position to judge how serious matters were, referred 
Lister to Simpson, an under-manager, or Nicol, the deputy manager. Even 
Nicol hesitated to take the positive step of declaring an emergency and it was 
not until 5.30 a.m., some two hours after the finding of the fire, that a general 
emergency was in  fact declared on the i nstructions of J. S. Wilson, production 
manager. I t  is true that many of the emergency measures required by the 
Emergency Organisation had already been taken as a result of the sheer pressure 
of events but such an essential one as the setting up of an I ncident Room was 
not achieved until 6.00 a.m. The Emergency Organisation was thoroughly 
comprehensi\e in  the range of action it required, but it  seems to have been 
associated in  the minds of some with the action to be taken on the occurrence 
of a fatal or serious personal injury accident. Moreover, the presentation of 
the organisation chart lacked the clarity which I regard as absolutely essential. 
The merit of a carefully devised emergency scheme is  that it removes from the 
individual the need to remember a great many things which have to be done 
quickly and effectively and to take decisions about priorities. The declaration 
of an emergency immediately results in the appointment of men to carry out 
specific tasks until they can be relieved on the arrival of more senior officials. 
107. There was no evidence to suggest that any authority to institute the 
Emergency Organisation had been specifically delegated to anyone either by 
name or by appointment. Indeed, I think J am right in saying that the manager 
held the view that it was the responsibility of any competent official to use his 
initiative and institute t he procedure if he thought the circumstances justified it. 
I have some sympathy with this, but the absence of timely action at the colliery 
on the morning of the fire merely supports the opposing view that too much 
reliance should not be placed on the readiness of persons to take the initiative 
i n  an emergency situation. when they are unsure of their authority to act. 
It is not so much a reluctance to take a decision which deters persons from 
acting in slIch circumstances as a fear of being accused of having acted hastily 
if. in the event, there is no emergency. 
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108. It  is imperati\e that the emergency procedure, mcludmg the posted 
charb. should be clear!) under'llOod by all officials and particularly that there 
::.hollld be no doubt in their mmds a., to their pO\\<er., to declare an emergency. 
The Nationru Coal Board should review their present procedures in this regard 
and give specific instructions to manager� that the senior official at the mine 
available at the time of an incident should be authorised. without prejudice. to 
call on the Rescue Station sen ices and to declare an Area emergency. 
The Checking System 
109. Some two hours after the start of the fire it was reported that all men 
had been withdrawn from the Dysart Dip Sections; this unfortunately prO\ed 
10 be false in that two men who had been working in that part of the mine were 
m fact still missing. As a result of this, the effectiveness of the checking system 
was calJed into question at the Inquiry. To my mind the system at the colliery 
was quite satisfactory. I recognise that it disclosed imperfections but it must 
be remembered that any system has to rely on the complete co-operation of 
the individual and that this i.;; al\\ays the limiting factor. As Mr. Wilson. for 
the Ministry of Power, said, the perfect checking system has yet to be devised; 
ne\ertheless the possibility of improving existing systems should be examined. 
I n  thb respect, the suggestion offered by Mr. McGahey, for the National 
Union of Mineworkers. that a man's tokens and cap lamp should bear the 
same number, is \Veil worthy of further consideration. 
The Marking of Second \Vays Out 
1 1 0. There was a considerable amount of e\'idence at the Inquiry about the 
sign posting of the airways and the second means of egress from the working 
sections to the surface. The rOlltes \\ere marked with chalk on boards, painted 
letters on boards and by luminous signs of letters three inches high with an 
arrow. I n  the returns. some of the signs directed men to the ' Return A if\\ay ' 
and In others to the ' Escape Pit '. It was not, howner, clear if the ' Escape 
Pit' \\a';) the M ichael 0. 2 Shaft or Loclthead Colliery. 
1 1  J .  A particular case of the confusion about the marl-..ing of the means of 
egress arose in  connection with the escape of McArthur and McEncamy from 
the Four Feet Seam workings in  the Sea Mine area to the inset in the No. 2 
Shaft. They had neither of them travelled the route before and they missed 
the way to the second means of egress when they went up the return air\Vay 
instead of down through Walker's Dook to the Loc.hhead Level. In the event, 
it \\as probably lucky that they did so as the Lochhead Level was full of thick 
smoke. Having missed the escape route they were nevertheless able to find the 
No. 2 Shaft, an indication that some of the signs were effecti\'e. Howc\cr, 
when they got to the shaft, they found their way on into old workings. which 
\\ere not regularly inspected and should therefore have been fenced off. They 
were prevented from rcaching the No. 3 Shaft because of a fence and a . no 
road ' sign which were not really necessary. 
1 1 2. I n  order to ensure that men can find their way, sometimes in smoke. 
through roads with which they are unfamiliar, the direction signs should be 
easily recognised and unambiguous. 1 consider that managements should 
review the methods of marking routes and adopt a standard type of sign. 
Officials in charge of the men in the various parts of the pit should not only be 
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conversant " ith all the means of egress but should ensure that they are safe 
for tra\clling and that the direction signs are properly maintained. I consider 
that officials should inspect every means of egres� from the part of the mme 
assigned to them at least once a month and re-port on their condition. 
The Telephone System 
1 1 3.  There were critical comments in e\ idence about the alleged inadequacy 
of the telephone system. These really stemmed, I think, from the fact that the 
automatic system became blocked just after 5.00 a.lll. but some witnesses 
suggested that the telephone system was generally unreliable. I am satisfied 
that in general the internal telephone systems were adequate and I �lccept the 
evidence or management and officials that, apart rrom the normal breakdowns, 
the systems \\ere reliable. I t  is readily apparent that a con�iderable number 
of emergency messages were passed within a comparati\ely brier period from 
about 3.30 a.m. onwards. The e",idence suggests that the blocking of the 
automatic system on the morning or the fire "'as brought about by a main 
telephone cable or junction box being put out of commission by the fire. The 
fault so caused \\ould have simulated the effect or all ten circuits. which the 
aUlOI1l3tic exchange provided, being occupied by calls. When 3n engineer 
disconnected the faulty circuits. the automatic exchange operated normally. 
1 1 4. ] have said that the internal telephone service \l,as adequate : nevertheless, 
there is scope for some improvement in  one particular rero:pect. As I understand 
it. the automatic telephones in the manager's and deputy manager's offices 
had over-rtding facilities. I n my \ ie\\. automatic telephone installations \\ ould 
be better equipped for use in an emergency if over-riding racilitic::, \\ere also 
provided at a strictly limited number or underground extensions, as for instance 
at pit bottoms and perhaps one in  each working district. The provision or 
such facihties would have to be accompanied by a strict mjunction that they 
should be used only in an emergency. A considerable amount or telephoning 
and, consequently. time, could ha\c been saved had the underground workings 
been equipped with a system of alarms operated rrom a central point on the 
surface. I am awarc that such systems, either in  the form or separate installa­
tions or associated with the telephone system. are available. The general 
provision or equipment of this kind should be considered as an early warning aid. 
1 1 5. Finally in this context, I would rerer to communications between the 
colliery and the outside world. There is no doubt that the outside telephone 
racilities. adequate in every respect for ordinary day-to-day needs. were woefully 
inadequate during the emergency. As it became J...nown that there \\as trouble 
at the colliery, there \\as a flood or incoming calls which seem to have occupied 
the limited switchboard facilities to the exclusion or outgoing calls. There is no 
doubt in my mind that much or the delay experienced by Nicol i n  making 
hi'5 call to the Rescue Station was caused by a blocked private branch exchange; 
in his evidence he recounted his rrustration \\ hen police and hospital calls 
came in  while he was waiting to make his call. Managements should review 
their external telephone arrangements and consult the telephone authorities 
with a view to alternative arrangements if there is any doubt that the present 
provisions might prove inadequate in an emergency. 
Self-Rescuers 
1 1 6. The question or self-rescuers was not raised In evidence but I took 
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note of a submission made on behalf of the National Coal Board that the 
Board had now decided in principle that self-rescuers should be provided 
for all underground workmen as soon as an acceptable model could be 
produced. Mr. McGahey pledged the full co-operation of his U nion In 
advancing the date of the introduction of this vital safety device into service 
underground. Within a very short time after the Inquiry, the National Coal 
Board set up a Working Party to " co-ordinate the procurement and introduction 
of self-rescuers and to consider \\ hcther the Board should themsel\ cs undcrtal..e 
manufacture ". Mr. H. T. Ramsay. the Director of the Safety in Mine.., 
Research Establishment. and I are members of it. 
Fire-Fighting Hydrants 
1 1 7. As has been indicated in the description of the colliery. there were eight 
fire hydrants in  the No. 3 Pit Bottom. of which four were in the 300 fathoms Lateral 
and four in the Loco Level. There is no doubt that this disposition of hydrant'i 
can be faulted on two counts. First, t hey \\ere confined to two roads and a 
fire occurring in some situations i n  either road could render half the hydrant:, 
unusable. The hydrants in the other road would then be equally uselc�s 
because they would be too far away. Second there was no hydrant in the 
Loader Mine or in  Bell's Heading; \\ith the ventilation travelling along the 
Loco Level towards Tilson's Alley. this meant that a fire in  the Loader l\tine 
could only be dealt with by fire-fighters operating in smoke. The installation 
of a hydrant on the inbye side of the Loader Mine. in  Bell's Heading. was 
planned but the \\ ork \\ as far from complete when the incident occurred. 
R EC O M M E N D A T I O N S  
1 1 8. I recommend that: 
( I )  (a) polyurethane foam as at present constituted, whether or not 
treated with a fire-retardant coating, should not be used under­
ground at any coal mine. or at the surface or any mine in sllch a 
situation that the products of its combustion would be likely to 
enter the mine; 
(b) any foam which has been placed in mo\ing ground or in  a situation 
where there is a spontaneous combustion hazard shall be remoHd 
immediately. or sealed off, or be given an adequate fire-retardant 
coating and removed within 1 2  months; 
( c) any foam which has been placed i n  a situation other than in (b) 
above shall be given an adequate fire-retardant coating and be 
removed as soon as practicable or sealed off. (Para. 104). 
(2) The National Coal Board should review the present procedures for 
implementation of the Emergency Organisation (including charts posted 
in  offices) and give specific instructions to managers that the senior 
official at the mine available at the time of an incident should be 
authorised, without prejudice, to call on the Rescue Station sen ices 
and to declare an Area emergency. (Para. 108). 
(3) The Board and H . M .  Inspectors should examine the possibility of 
improving the checking systems. (Paras. 1 2  and 1 09). 
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(4) The methods of sign posting all means of egress should be examined and 
a standard method instituted. (Para. 1 1 2). 
(5) Overmen and deputie-s shall at least once in every month inspect and 
report on the state of every means of egress from the parts of the mine 
assigned to them. (Para. 1 1 2). 
1 1 9. In order that action should be taken without delay on the above 
recommendations, your predecessor agreed that I should submit them to the 
interested parties and this was done in February, 1 968. 
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1 20. I should like to record my extreme indebtedness to the repre<::entati\es 
of the parties appearing at the Inquiry, who, by their courtesy and complete 
co-operation. facilitated the course of the proceedings, and to the many witnesses 
who gave their evidence '!>o ably and clearly. I am also most grateful to those 
who were concerned with the investigations prior to. and preparations for. 
the Inquiry: the staff of the National Coal Board, and in particular, Mr. W. H .  
Jrvine, the colliery surveyor, for his excellent plans and for his assistance at the 
proceedings; representatives of mining officials and workpeople; and members 
of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment and H . M .  I nspectorate. My 
thanks are also due 10 the Burgh Council of Kirkc.:'lldy, to the Town Clerk. 
Mr. C. D. Chapman, and his stafT and to Superintendent Stirrat of the Fifeshire 
Constabulary for all their help and assistance before and during the 
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f have the honour to be, Sir, 
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Your obedient Servant, 
H .  S. STEPHENSON. 
A P P E N D I X  I 
Names of the Deceased 
Name Age Occllpation 
1 .  Recove,.ed on 9,,, Septembe,., 1967 
Alexander Henderson 
Henry Morrison 




2. Not fO/lnd 
Hugh GaLlachcr . .  
lames McKay . . 
Andrew Taylor . . 
. .  





. .  
. .  
• •  
. .  
. . 
. . 
41 Power loader operator 
. . 36 Power loader operator 
60 Power loader operator 
41 Overman 




. .  43 Deputy 






Barker, A. H. 
Barr, T. . . 
Birre!!, T. 
Bottomley, M. R. 
Brown, J. T. 
Cairns, A. 
Chrystal, J. 
Cowie. G. C. 
Coyie, I-I. 
Cull, W _ _  _ 
Culross, J. 
Daiy, H. " 
Dewar, O. 
Drummond, J. 
Drummond, J. H. 
Dryburgh, D. C. 
Duncan, O. 
Dunean, J. 
Fraser, R. C. M. 
Fry, G. T. 
Grieve, A.  
Herriot, O. S. B. 
Hunter, D. 
Hunter, J. M .  
Hynes, M .  
[mrie, J .  M ,  
lrvine, L. M .  
Irvine, W. H. 
lzatt, 1. 



























A P P E N D I X  11 
List of Witnesses 
- . 
Occupation 
Pennanent Rescue Brigade man 
Deputy 




H.M. Inspector of Mines and Quarries 
Deputy 











CoUiery General Manager 
Greaser 
Deputy 
Senior ScientificTechnical Officer, National 
Coal Board 
Maintenance man 
Rescue Station Instructor 
Deputy 
Backbrusher 




Cable belt attendant 




Lisler, T . . . 
Logic, D. K. 
Lyle, J. 
Name 
Mac Bride, W. R. 
Malcolm, J.  McG. 
McArthur, J. 
McDonald, J. 
McEneamy, J. C. 
Mclntyre, R. 




Meharry, M .  
Moyes, J .  S. 
Nicol, A. 
Nowak, J. E. 
Orr, J. 
Patcrson, W. K. 












Simpson, J. P. 





Deputy (in charge of Surface Control 
Room) 
Time Office clerk 
Backbrusher 
Deputy 









Assistant Personnel Manager 
Bricklayer (part-time rescue man) 
Colliery Deputy Manager 
Belt maintenance man 
8ackbrusber 
Deputy 
Deputy Managing Director of Caledolllan 
Mining Company 
Face worker (part-time rescue man) 
Backbrusher 
Colliery Under-manager 
Deputy Director (Operations), North 
Scotland Area 
Rescue Station Instructor 
Overman 
Rescue Station Instructor 
Overman 







Teevan, J.  J. 
Thomson, J.  M .  
Thomson, W. 
Todd, A. S. 
Todd, R. 
WaIJace, R. M .  
Watson, A .  
Watson, J .  
Webstcr, C. 
W;ghl, J.  
W;lde, D. G. 
Wilson, Daniel 
Wilson, David 
Wilson, J. S. 
WIIson, W. L. 
Name Occupatio" 
Onsetter 
Chain maintenance man 
Rescue Station Superintendent 
Overman 
Supports Economy Officer 









Colliery Electrical Engineer 
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